"They All Had Guns"

"They All Had Guns"

        As usual, Good Morning America provided me with a subject. This morning it was provided in an interview by George Stephanopoulos with Bill O'Reilly, who continues to pretend he's really a "history guy" instead of stuffed shirt Far Right sycophant. In the discussion of things political, the conversation turned to the current renewal of gun control interest following  the tragic shootings at Pulse in Orlando. Putting one's personal feelings on the issue aside for the sake of brevity, simply consider this ludicrous statement by O'Reilly: "Of course, we won the Revolutionary War because everyone was armed!"

        It is well known to those who care to look beneath the hype, that O'Reilly's popular books are mainly "ghosted" by real authors, with O'Reilly's name in large print to sell books to those who are used to reading small words in big letters. This statement, however, reveals either the true lack of depth in his actual knowledge base or the fact that he is just a liar. I could vote either way.

         As a simple high school history teacher, I can see a plethora of flaws in his statement. Let's start with the statement itself : "Everyone was armed."  That would only be significant if everyone was on the side of independence. However,  allowing John Adams to be our source,  “I should say that full one third were averse to the revolution…. An opposite third… gave themselves up to an enthusiastic gratitude to France.  The middle third,… always averse to war, were rather lukewarm both to England and France;….”   Some historians take issue with this, but the largest estimate I have ever found of actual supporters of the independence movement is 40%! This means that if "everyone was armed" and they shot it out, well,,,,you get the picture.

        Second, regardless of who was armed and how many there were, the Continental army was fraught with desertions  (so "armed" or not, they went home!)  with Washington's 16,500 at Boston dwindling to about 13,000 even before any really serious fighting began. Over the entire course of the war this percentage was relatively constant.    

        Third, and perhaps more important than colonial leadership and military prowess, were considerations involving the British. The first was commitment, as even former, but supremely influential, Prime Minister William Pitt opposed armed intervention. King George, grappling with Porphyria and in and out of lucidity  refused such American conciliatory  advances as the Olive Branch petition, and a succession of incompetent Cabinet ministers completed the trifecta.

        Fourth and equally damaging to the British chances of a military victory was the general incompetence of the British Army's  senior military chain of command. Details are well known and too numerous to cover in toto, but Burgoyne's Saratoga blunder and Howe's refusal to follow orders are just a sample of a consistently poor senior command. Eventually, following Yorktown, Britain simply "got tired" and quit.

        Fifth, the final straw, at Yorktown happens,  not because  of Americans with guns, but because of the French with ships and guns. 24 modern ships of the line mounting 1,542 guns to be precise. Some historians have maintained that Britain had no hope of victory after 1777, but that assumption constitutes another myth of this war. Twenty-four months into its Southern Strategy, Britain was close to reclaiming substantial territory within its once-vast American empire. Royal authority had been restored in Georgia, and much of South Carolina was occupied by the British. In fact the British had experienced very little difficulty in raising "loyalist" regiments in Georgia.

          As 1781 dawned, Washington warned that his army was “exhausted” and the citizenry “discontented.” John Adams believed that France, faced with mounting debts and having failed to win a single victory in the American theater, would not remain in the war beyond 1781. “We are in the Moment of Crisis,” he wrote. (French General) Rochambeau feared that 1781 would see the “last struggle of an expiring patriotism.” Both Washington and Adams assumed that unless the United States and France scored a decisive victory in 1781, the outcome of the war would be determined at a conference of Europe’s great powers. That decisive victory came  on land, but was enabled at sea by The Battle of the Virginia Capes, in which French  Admiral Francois-Joseph Paul, Comte de Grasse defeated British Admiral Hood, trapping  Cornwallis'  army at Yorktown, so that Washington, bolstered by over 5,000 fresh French troops (with guns) could force surrender.   

        The second amendment to the eventually approved US Constitution specifies, "A well regulated militia being....." There is very little chance that this was ever meant to be "They" all had (or should have) guns. Washington was essentially forced to fight the opening phases of the war with militia because there was no Continental military force of any kind at the beginning there war. Early attempts to form a standing Continental army were met with some objection by Continentals who today we would probably call "Libertarians."  Patrick Henry was one such person, and although he is oft quoted, his definition of  "liberty" included the right to own people of color and do as he pleased regardless of how others suffered for it.

        As militia operations, especially in the North became more and more ragged and troop strengths unpredictable it became more and more obvious that militias were anything but "well regulated" Hamilton wrote extensively on this issue, both before and after ratification of the Constitution. So what changed?

        Another,  more gradual,  major momentum shift  occurred when Congress abandoned one-year enlistments and transformed the Continental Army into a standing army, made up of regulars who volunteered—or were conscripted—for long-term service. A standing army was contrary to American tradition and was viewed as unacceptable by citizens who understood that history was filled with instances of generals who had used their armies to gain dictatorial powers. Among the critics was Massachusetts’ John Adams. As a delegate to the Second Continental Congress, In 1775, he wrote that he feared a standing army would become an “armed monster” composed of the “meanest, idlest, most intemperate and worthless” men. By autumn, 1776, 7 years before Yorktown,  Adams had changed his view, remarking that unless the length of enlistment was extended, “our inevitable destruction will be the Consequence.” At last, Washington would get the army he had wanted from the outset; its soldiers would be better trained, better disciplined and more experienced than the men who had served in 1775-76. This standing, organized, professional army, in fact, is what Madison meant by "A well regulated militia. "regardless of verbage, it did not mean "rednecks with guns."  Today we would expand this to include the National Guard, regulated at the State level most of the time and Federal when appropriate

        O'Reilly should and, in fact, may well know how ludicrous his statement was. The problem is that he usually plays to an audience of drones, eager to be led by anyone who can use words of more than two syllables.