Twenty Four Years Later

Forward:   After I first finished and polished this piece (2018), I decided to let it rest overnight and revisit it this morning. This was based on my concern that rehashing events of 24 years ago was a sort of retrograde finger pointing. Upon further consideration, I decided that there are still too many parallels in the here and now to make that a valid objection. I further reflected that we as a national policy (apparently) are currently engaged in dithering over both parties principally responsible for current Arab-Israeli tensions. While Trump visited the Saudis and massaged what-ever the hell that large glowing orb was and called the Prince a “nice” man (yeah, he calls Putin that too!), he supported Netanyahu’s urban removal incursions into Palestinian areas. We currently are all too familiar with the result thereof.  He also chastises any American Jews with conscience who find Netanyahu and his militant policies objectionable. It’s as if Tucker Carlson and Ann Coulter had a mentally challenged love child.

        Consequently, while this is significantly longer than many of my opuses, it is data based and, I think, explains why we mourn on September 11, as well as pointing out that we were poorly served, security wise, then and now in the name of political expediency and personal interests. I don’t do these for personal approbation, and this may anger some, but I would welcome any constructive comments or criticisms. Having said that, enjoy it or not, here’s my best take, salted with opinion based on facts, on what happened and why. P.S. there’s a bit of a history lesson here too. 

        To begin with, wouldn’t it be far better to have spent yesterday reflecting on a thwarted attempt, than simply commemorating over 3,000 dead? It might, and could/should have been, but obviously we’ll never know. What we can “know” is that there are public records which show just how badly Bush 43 and his National “security?” aides botched what was a fairly straight- forward problem in the months prior to 9/11. I’ll summarize before rather than after. I know it’s backwards, but it may help focus the reader’s appreciation of individual items.\

        Several things are factual and no longer either debated of “covered up:”

 1) The Clinton administration left the Bush White House and national security team with a full terrorist threat briefing identifying Al-Qaeda as the top threat and had, in the last year of tenure, identified anti-terrorism as the nations’ top priority.

 

2) The FBI and the CIA, functioning more like schoolyard mean girls than agencies entrusted with national domestic and foreign security, failed on two fatal levels.  The first was to get over adolescent turf squabbles and understand that in the 21st century, there is, at best, an increasingly vague interface between domestic and external threats.

3) Failing to understand (or at least to act upon) (2), above led to an institutionalized aversion to interagency cooperation and even worse, refusal to share data access between the agencies. In fact, both heads of agency post WWII, FBI director J. Edgar Hoover and (first) CIA director James Jesus Angleton were frequently at odds even then to the point that what should have been overlapping goals such as  dealing with espionage inside the US, degenerated into interdepartmental urination derbies, each blaming the other for perceived failures. 

4) The relationship between several US Presidents and the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, while falling short of complicity in 9/11 events, fostered a less than rigorous scrutiny of its internal dynamic and external goals. This would seem to be on-going as one regards the Trump administration’s apparent blind eye to the assassination and dismemberment of Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on 2 October 2018 by agents of the Saudi government. Subsequently, the Turkish government (who had bugged the consulate) released a tape with Khashoggi’s last words (“I can’t breathe”) which they maintain contains evidence that Khashoggi was assassinated on the orders of the Saudi Royal Family. Additionally, the CIA, which Trump largely ignores, has categorically concluded that the Al Saud royal family would have had to sanction such an activity, Trump has consistently refused to consider that his buddy, Prince Mohammed ben Salman could have done such a thing. Here’s a quote on Trump’s keen sense of propriety.  Speaking to the press: “Trump more broadly defended his relationships with world leaders, including the Saudis and Russian President Vladimir Putin, saying he gets "along with a lot of people."  "I get along with everybody, except you people, (meaning the press)" Trump told Acosta. "I also get along with people who would be perceived as being very nice." "I get along with President Putin. I get along with Mohammed," Trump said.  Isn’t that “very nice?” That’s today, but what about “then?”

        First: Why did it take 15 years for the US House to even address the issue of Saudi complicity to the point of liability for the events of 9/11? What follows is based only on my assumptions based on research re: The Bush family and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and my knowledge of the mentality of the (then Republican) House majority party.

        Bob Woodward in his authorized bio of "W" pointed out that the late George H.W. Bush advised his son to contact Saudi Prince Bandar to discuss and "be advised" regarding his (as of then) possible decision to run for the Presidency. Read that again. Huh? Did he need permission, or just assurances of support from a mid-east nation? This, as well as deep and longstanding Bush financial relations with the Kingdom should be troubling to most Americans.

        At this point let's ask and then pose answers to the original question.  Why did the Bush administration in its righteous anger in the wake of the destruction of 9/11, or at least after the Commission report, containing the redacted pages, not pose legislation critical of and citing probative evidence of Saudi complicity? Additionally, why wait until the Obama years to push a bill even allowing US citizens to sue the Saudi government for it?

         I would posit several reasons.  Primarily, the Bush administration, having taken office planning to "finish" daddy's Iraq adventure (later admitted by disillusioned staff), saw the need to base US forces in the Kingdom as more important than holding the Saudis accountable for the funding which Osama Bin Laden derived from his family's immense wealth.  Second, the President would certainly have vetoed such a bill, since in the real world it would expose the US to similar suits from most Middle Eastern nations, Laos, Cambodia, and others.

         Jump ahead to the Obama administration, and a US Congress controlled (again) by Republicans, most of whom delighted in using the ignorance of the body politic against a President whose laundry they weren't fit to wash. The “permission to sue” bill's timing was blatantly designed to force the President to veto it (as Bush would have) and then the finger pointing started, stimulating oral frothing and finger pointing from the redneck hordes who chronically know little and suspect even less.

       Immediately the Clinton-Obama bashing ramped up. The Bill was vetoed and subsequently overridden, creating bad law after even worse poor policy.  Incidentally, this apparent pang of sympathy for 9/11 victims with all the resultant lobbying monies spent by the NFL, MLB and other public persona organizations would be far better used in helping those 9/11 first responders and escapees whose medical issues continued to emerge, largely unrecognized or compensated by the rest of us.

        Having referred to the 9/11 Commission Report, I think it reasonable to make some legitimate comparisons between this "fact" finding attempt and the investigations into other, albeit less profound in their scope, events resulting in American deaths at the hands of Islamist extremists.

       There were attacks on several US installations in Lebanon in the Reagan years. I have earlier detailed the results of these events and Congressional reactions. There is no credible linkage between events in Lebanon and the Saudis, but Congressional reaction was bi-partisan.

       I debated (with myself, because I trust me) regarding which "commission" to discuss next, and simply because I want the 9/11 information to remain in the reader's mind, I'll omit Benghazi, having written on that debacle at length earlier. 

 

        Which brings me to the 9/11 Commission. Right up front, I have no time for conspiracy theories.  No, I don't think "W" did it or intentionally allowed it to happen. I believe that those who were ultimately blamed for it, did it, more than likely with the financial support of Saudi money, albeit probably not overtly supported or contributed to by the Saudi government, but rather from other Saudi sources, coupled with institutional agreement among Saudi royals that the best way to deal with their extremist, ultra Islamist, Wahabi driven elements within and without was to ignore them and their support of international terrorist activities in the interest of domestic stability at home.

         So, what is this Wahabi? It isn't a sushi condiment even though it sounds like Wasabi.  I could write a lot on Wahabism and its impact on the kingdom, but, for a more easily understood narrative, let’s look it thus:

       Imagine one Muslim, but not especially conservative, family whose patriarch manages to survive a great war (WWI) and with the assistance of T.E Lawrence, emerges as a self- proclaimed  Arab leader asserting a claim to be the ruling family of a disparate, but soon to be oil rich, kingdom and unified by 1932 as Saudi Arabia. Faced with oil wealth and the desire to become more accepted by an emerging modern world, they begin allowing more secular dress and activities than their predecessors who were conservative and largely tribal.  Meanwhile, however, out in the rural areas, a far more conservative preacher (mullah) begins preaching a grass roots revival stressing a return to absolute and literal Quran principles. Think Westboro Baptist Church with a liberal splash of Calvinist zeal and a dash of uber-Amish conservatism. His (the mullah Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab) adherents, simple people, and easily swayed to violence against any non-coreligionists, are seen by the urban and more urbane royals as a threat to their claim to power, so the royals, make a self-serving deal. They’ll support the ultra-conservative sect as the national religious doctrine in exchange for the sect’s support of their claim to power. Clubs, once frequented by both sexes in cities like Riyadh in the 1960s are closed, Burqas and Hijabs are mandated, women are relegated to second class status, etc. Enforcement is provided and mandated by The Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. Welcome to the 21st century Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. An even more sinister spin off of this deal with the Devil, is the blind eye turned to terrorist activities by some of their own.    

Now that we've established what history has wrought, let's look at the 9/11 commission.

         The 9/11 Commission members were appointed by President George W. Bush and the United States Congress, which led to continued criticism that the Commission was not independent. Nixon SecState Henry Kissinger initially was appointed to head the commission, but resigned just weeks after being appointed, because he would have been obliged to disclose the clients of his private consulting business. Former U.S. Senator George Mitchell was originally appointed as the vice-chairman, but he stepped down on December 10, 2002, not wanting to sever ties to his law firm. So, finally, the Commission wasn't chaired by the "opposition party" but rather by men selected by the leader of the majority, himself. Hmmm. The Commission stated in its report that their aim was "... not to assign individual blame", a rather remarkable statement in and of itself, since so many died, someone certainly was to blame, and every single identified perpetrator was a Saudi and their financial supporters were as well. The "other" blame - "why was it possible," was also, apparently not to be probed too deeply.

         This judgment, some critics believed, could obscure the facts of the matter in a nod to consensus politics, as directed by the White House, if not specifically the President (more likely Dick Cheney, I believe) Factually, much of the orchestration of this was from the brains of Karl Rove and VP Cheney.    

        Some members of the Commission, as well as its executive director Philip Zelikow, had conflicts of interest. Philip Shenon, a New York Times reporter, in a February 2008 book  entitled "The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation" states that "Zelikow had closer ties with the White House than he publicly disclosed and that he tried to influence the final report in ways that the staff often perceived as limiting the Bush administration’s responsibility and furthering its anti-Iraq agenda."

|         Translate this as a desire to do what damage control could be done to shift blame to Iraq for what was a Saudi money funded and run assault on America. And boy did that work! Many Americans still will say that Iraq was responsible for events of 9/11.  According to Shenon (and uncontroverted), Zelikow had at least four private conversations with former White House political director Karl Rove, and appears to have had many frequent telephone conversations with people in the White House. Government Accountability Office (GAO) records show his frequent calls to the 456 telephone exchange in the 202 area code used exclusively by the White House. Some panel staff members have later stated that Zelikow stopped them from submitting a report depicting Nat'l Sec. Advisor, Condoleezza Rice's and President Bush's performance as "amounting to incompetence or something not far from it".

       According to Shenon, Karl Rove always feared that a commission report that laid the blame for 9/11 at the president's doorstep (such as when Bush terrorism "czar" Richard Clarke could no longer be prevented from testifying about his urgent warnings over the summer of 2001 to Condoleezza Rice about the imminent threat of terrorist attack on US soil) was the one development that could most jeopardize Bush's 2004 re-election. As early as Jan. 25, in a memo only subsequently declassified, Clarke was very specific in warnings to Rice that "Al Qida" (sic) was a serious domestic threat and shared his concern that the administration wasn't focused on it in spite of fairly specific Clinton departure brief warnings.

        In contrast to the Benghazi hearings in which all the relevant persons were summoned, sworn and examined at the will of the panel, President Bush and Vice President Cheney did ultimately, but after considerable stalling, agree to testify. They did so only under several conditions: They would be allowed to testify jointly, They would not be required to take an oath before testifying, The testimony would not be recorded electronically or transcribed, and that the only record would be notes taken by one of the commission staffers. These notes would never be made public. Plainly stated, they didn't want to testify, but would do so if they could lie (or dissemble or mislead) and not be held accountable.

        To further hinder and filter the flow of information, The Commission was forced to use subpoenas simply to obtain the cooperation of the FAA and NORAD (Federal Aviation Administration and North American Air Defense Command) to release evidence such as audiotapes. The agencies' seemingly systematic and apparently White House “encouraged”  reluctance to release tapes, and subsequent, e-mails, erroneous public statements and other evidence led some of the panel's staff members and commissioners to believe that authorities sought to mislead the commission and the public about what happened on September 11. Later, in an August 2006 interview former New Jersey Atty. Gen. John Farmer, who led the staff inquiry into events on September 11, stated, "I was shocked at how different the truth was from the way it was described," said.

       A significant number of former FBI, NSA and other federal intelligence experts, claim the 9/11 Commission report was fundamentally flawed because the Commission refused to hear, ignored, or censored testimony about the many pre–September 11 warnings given to the FBI and US intelligence agencies. (Again, because it lent credibility to the Bush/Rice incompetence theory.) These former operatives claim that, in an effort to avoid having to hold any individual accountable, the 9/11 Commission turned a blind eye on FBI agent-provided evidence before September 11 regarding the 9/11 plot. Note, this may be taken with several grains of salt because it also smacks of “ass-covering” by the FBI.

       Able Danger: A far less publicized intelligence unit involved in pre-9/11 threat assessment was a military unit designated "Able Danger."  Most Americans have never heard of it, and even fewer had knowledge of it pre-9/11. One reason was that by custom, tradition and, in fact, law, US military resources are forbidden from engaging in any sort of domestic surveillance, some of which Able Danger came very close to doing. That said, several members of this unit have, in the wake of the Commission report, made some significant statements which have bearing on this essay. The existence of Able Danger was revealed by Congressman Curt Weldon (R-Pa) in 2005, after the 9/11 Commission report began to look to him like a "cover up" (his characterization) for intelligence failures. During the summer of 2005, Weldon, vice-chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, revealed the existence of a secret Pentagon counter-terrorism operation codenamed Able Danger, which he claimed had identified Mohammed Atta, alleged, and later confirmed,  ringleader of the 9/11 attacks, as early as 1999.

        It has been widely reported in Europe that Atta was known to US intelligence agencies and was actually under FBI surveillance in Germany as early as 1999, which seriously  undermines  Bush administration claims that the 9/11 attacks came out of the blue and that the US government had no idea before September 2001 that Al Qaeda terrorists were in the United States planning terrorist attacks.  This information has been largely suppressed in the American media, and the existence of Able Danger was omitted in the official 9/11 Commission report in order to sustain its whitewash of the role of US military and intelligence agencies in permitting and even facilitating the attacks. Secret or not, Congressman Weldon stated in committee that Able Danger had also identified three other future 9/11 hijackers as Al Qaeda loyalists: Marwan Al-Shehhi, Khalid Almidhar and Nawaf Alhazmi. He also claimed that he had been in possession of a “link chart” tracing the connections of various individuals connected to Al Qaeda, and containing Atta’s photograph and name, and had turned it over to deputy national security adviser Stephen Hadley at a meeting in the White House on September 25, 2001. Both Hadley and another Republican congressman, Dan Burton of Indiana, have confirmed the meeting with Weldon on that date and the handover of the link chart. The chart itself "disappeared", according to the Bush White House. Convenient, huh?

         After Weldon's assertions were disputed and the credibility of Able Danger impugned, Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, a member of the Able Danger team, identified himself as Weldon's source. Shaffer stated categorically that he alerted the FBI in September 2000 about the information uncovered by the secret military unit (Able Danger), he further alleged that three meetings he set up with bureau officials were blocked by military lawyers. Shaffer, who at the time worked for the Defense Intelligence Agency, claims he communicated to members of the 9/11 Commission that Able Danger had identified two of the three cells responsible for 9/11 prior to the attacks, but the Commission did not include this information in their final report.

        Shaffer specifically stated that in Jan 2000, Able Danger datamining revealed the existence of a 'Brooklyn' Al-Qaeda cell connected to the "Blind Sheik" Omar Abdel-Rahman, as well as two other cells overseas. Shaffer was soon after placed on paid administrative leave for what he called "petty and frivolous" reasons and had his security clearance suspended in March 2004, following a dispute over travel mileage expenses and personal use of a work cell phone. These allegations are claimed to have been pursued in bad faith & breach of process, in relation for Shaffer talking to the 9/11 Commission.

        Congressman Weldon asked for a probe into the activities undertaken to silence Lt. Col. Shaffer from publicly commenting on Able Danger and Able Danger's identification of the 9/11 hijackers, calling the activities "a deliberate campaign of character assassination." The Army agreed, Army investigations subsequently found these claims to be without merit and cleared his promotion.

        Shaffer also told the story of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) opposition to Able Danger, prior to 9/11, based on the view that Able Danger was encroaching on CIA turf. According to Shaffer, the CIA representative said, "I clearly understand. We're going after the leadership. You guys are going after the body, but it doesn't matter. The bottom line is, CIA will never give you the best information from 'Alex Base' (the CIA's top-secret database) or anywhere else. CIA will never provide that to you because if you were successful in your effort to target Al Qaeda, you will steal our thunder. Therefore, we will not support this." This lack of inter-agency cooperation as well as the "Information Wall" (previously illustrated as existing since the 1950s which existed between the FBI and CIA at the time has been held by many interested parties as a critical failure to protect the nation because of petty inter-agency turf wars.

 

 

 

            If Schaffer/Weldon were the only ex- Able Danger voices crying in the night, it might be easy to dismiss their claims. However, this simply isn’t the case. Navy Captain Scott Phillpott, another Able danger member, confirmed Shaffer's claims. "I will not discuss this outside of my chain of command", Phillpott said in a formal public statement. "I have briefed the Department of the Army, the Special Operations Command and the office of (Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence) as well as the 9/11 Commission. My story has remained consistent. "Mohammed Atta was identified as a threat by Able Danger in January/February 2000".

           Shaffer's claims were also confirmed by James D. Smith, a civilian contractor who worked on Able Danger. In a later interview with media personnel, Smith reported that the project had involved analysis of data from many public sources and 20 to 30 individuals. He stated that Atta's name had emerged during an examination of individuals known to have ties to Omar Abdel Rahman, a leading figure in the first World Trade Center bombing – a failed underground garage car bomb.

         Finally, regarding Able Baker, and the massive intelligence failure leading to 9/11: “Operation Dark Heart” by Anthony A. Shaffer, released in September 2010, includes memories of his time reporting to the 9/11 commission about Able Danger's findings. The 10,000 copies of the books have not been released yet. The DOD's Defense Intelligence Agency reviewers identified more than 200 passages suspected of containing classified information. "Specifically, the DIA wanted references to a meeting between Lt. Col. Tony Shaffer, the book's author, and the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, Philip Zelikow, removed." There can, in my opinion, be only one explanation for such concerns, that being that it casts the shadow of "cover up" on the entire proceeding if the man responsible for the investigation knew of Able Danger and omitted it (by directive) from the final version.  DOD took the highly unusual step of purchasing all available copies of Shaffer's book at a cost of $47,000 and destroying them to deny the public the ability to read the book.

        At this point is valid to ponder the (apparent) sense of necessity to not publicly acknowledge the existence of Able Danger. While it is wholly conjecture on my part, I think there are several probable factors. The first, relatively straightforward, was the level of classification of the operation at the time, and the sometimes-slavish sacrifice of public “need to know” on the National Security altar. We have previously seen Nixon attempt to obfuscate evidence of Oval Office condoned malfeasance under that same umbrella.

More valid, I think is the hesitance to reveal the existence of a security operation which was neither fish nor fowl. The FBI is entrusted with domestic enforcement and, if appropriate, surveillance. The CIA is charged with intelligence gathering, but not domestic enforcement, and its mandated focus is overseas. The US military, unlike in some other nations, traditionally has no role, barring extremely exigent circumstances, in domestic issues, be they security, criminal prosecution, or espionage. Able Danger, however, comprised of (non-CIA or FBI) civilian and active-duty military representatives from all services represented a clear departure from this tradition. I feel there was some concern for what the general reaction to discovery of its mission might have been. Regardless of that fact, rejection of its findings and warnings by National Security inner circle entities including FBI, CIA, and the White House is puzzling to say the least. As more corroboration emerged of Able Danger information, the harder this question is to answer with any reasonable conclusion. 

        There is one final oddity here on I wish to comment. Bush National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice strenuously dug in her heels, like her boss and Cheney to avoid testifying to the committee. She at first claimed she was a civilian employee of the administration, ergo was immune to subpoena, but was finally persuaded to do so. Here (because they are informative) are just a sampling of the questions she was asked under oath and when appropriate, some elucidation related to the veracity of her responses:

(Where it says "CLAIM" what follows are Ms. Rice's precise words. The statements after "FACT" are actual verified data)

CLAIM: "I do not remember any reports to us, a kind of strategic warning, that planes might be used as weapons."

 

FACT: Condoleezza Rice was the top National Security official with President Bush at the July 2001 G-8 summit in Genoa. There, "U.S. officials were warned that Islamic terrorists might attempt to crash an airliner" into the summit, prompting officials to "close the airspace over Genoa and station antiaircraft guns at the city’s airport." [Sources: Los Angeles Times, 9/27/01; White House release, 7/22/01]

CLAIM: "I was certainly not aware of [intelligence reports about planes as missiles] at the time that I spoke" in 2002.

FACT: While Rice may not have been aware of the 12 separate and explicit warnings about terrorists using planes as weapons when she made her denial in 2002, she did know about them when she wrote her March 22, 2004 Washington Post op-ed. In that piece, she once again repeated the claim there was no indication "that terrorists were preparing to attack the homeland using airplanes as missiles." [Source: Washington Post, 3/22/04]

CLAIM: There was "nothing about the threat of attack in the U.S." in the Presidential Daily Briefing the President received on August 6th.

FACT: Rice herself later admitted that "the title [of the PDB] was, ‘Bin Laden Determined to Attack Inside the United States.’" [Source: Condoleezza Rice, 4/8/04] Sounds a little threatening, huh?

CLAIM: "One of the problems was there was really nothing that looked like was going to happen inside the United States…Almost all of the reports focused on al-Qaida activities outside the United States, especially in the Middle East and North Africa…We did not have…threat information that was in any way specific enough to suggest something was coming in the United States."

FACT: Page 204 of the Joint Congressional Inquiry into 9/11 noted that "In May 2001, the intelligence community obtained a report that Bin Laden supporters were planning to infiltrate the United States" to "carry out a terrorist operation using high explosives." The report "was included in an intelligence report for senior government officials in August [2001]." In the same month, the Pentagon "acquired and shared with other elements of the Intelligence Community information suggesting that seven persons associated with Bin Laden had departed various locations for Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States." [Sources: Joint Congressional Report, 12/02]

CLAIM: "If we had known an attack was coming against the United States…we would have moved heaven and earth to stop it."

FACT: a year later, Rice admits that she was told that "an attack was coming." She said, "Let me read you some of the actual chatter that was picked up in that spring and summer": "Unbelievable news coming in weeks", said one. "Big event — there will be a very, very, very, very big uproar. There will be attacks in the near future." [Source: Condoleezza Rice, 4/8/04]

 

CLAIM: "The Vice President was, a little later in, I think, in May, tasked by the President to put together a group to look at all of the recommendations that had been made about domestic preparedness and all of the questions associated with that."

FACT: The Vice President’s task force never once convened a meeting. In the same time period, the Vice President (Dick Cheney, former oil company employee) convened at least 10 meetings of his energy task force, and six meetings with Enron executives. [Source: Washington Post, 1/20/02; GAO Report, 8/03] What a “Dick!”

 

CLAIM: "The decision that we made was to, first of all, have no drop-off in what the Clinton administration was doing, because clearly they had done a lot of work to deal with this very important priority."

FACT: Internal government documents show that the Clinton Administration officially prioritized counterterrorism as a "Tier One" priority, but when the Bush Administration took office, top officials downgraded counterterrorism. As the Washington Post reported, these documents show that before Sept. 11 the Bush Administration "did not give terrorism top billing." Rice admitted that "we decided to take a different track" than the Clinton Administration in protecting America. [Source: Internal government documents, 1998-2001; Washington Post, 3/22/04; Rice testimony, 4/8/04]

 CLAIM: The Bush Administration has been committed to the "transformation of the FBI into an agency dedicated to fighting terror."

FACT: Before 9/11, Attorney General John Ashcroft de-emphasized counterterrorism at the FBI, in favor of more traditional law enforcement. And according to the Washington Post, "in the early days after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the Bush White House cut by nearly two-thirds an emergency request for counterterrorism funds by the FBI, an internal administration budget document shows." And according to a new report by the Congressional Research Service, "numerous confidential law enforcement and intelligence sources now challenge the FBI’s claim that it has successfully retooled itself to gather critical intelligence on terrorists as well as fight crime." [Source: Washington Post, 3/22/04; Congressional Quarterly, 4/6/04]

CLAIM: "The FBI issued at least three nationwide warnings to federal, state and law enforcement agencies and specifically stated that, although the vast majority of the information indicated overseas targets, attacks against the homeland could not be ruled out. The FBI tasked all 56 of its U.S. field offices to increase surveillance of known suspects of terrorists and to reach out to known informants who might have information on terrorist activities."

FACT: The warnings were "feckless. (def: lacking initiative or strength of character; irresponsible.) They didn’t tell anybody anything. They don’t bring anyone to battle stations." [Source: 9/11 Commissioner Jamie Gorelick, 4/8/04]

CLAIM: "I think that having a Homeland Security Department that can bring together the FAA and the INS and Customs and all of the various agencies is a very important step."

FACT: The White House and Ms. Rice, initially at least, vehemently opposed the creation of the Department of Homeland security. Its opposition to the concept delayed the creation of the department by months.

        It should be noted that Ms. Rice was compensated about the same as a U.S. Senator for her work here and in helping push the US into Iraq, thus facilitating the creation of ISIS.

        And last, what is in the redacted pages of this report? Who will it further embarrass? Beats me, but I'll bet the gist of it is that some prominent Saudis were complicit in helping Mohammad Atta and his band of one-way pilots obtain entry in the US under other than legitimate pretense. I wouldn't anticipate finding out much more about the incompetence of the Bush administration of the inadequacies of the 9/11 Commission report, because that's been done.

        Eighteen years on, we were again treated to the spectacle of a US President (Trump) toadying to the Saudis in Riyadh and, later overlooking the real perpetrators of the butchery of a reporter in a third country, referring to the Princes as “nice people.”  While we remember and mourn the deaths of thousands of Americans, and while we, to varying degrees, apportion blame to the Kingdom, which certainly is culpable to a great extent, let’s also remember that some people we elected to office and to whom we entrusted our safety, failed us miserably for various reasons, among them financial concerns, access to oil, and, sadly, just plain incompetence. Tragically, it seems we are presently little better off after the 3000 needless deaths .