The issue of
teaching critical race issue (or not) has an earlier parallel, at least for me
as an older History teacher. That was the issue of US involvement in Southeast
Asia. I had enlisted in the US Navy 1964, in large part because I believed the
US involvement in Vietnam to be misguided and flawed policy (and my draft
number was up). 34 years later, as an Advanced Placement United States (APUS)
History teacher, I sometimes had students whose fathers or other male relatives
had been personally involved in the 20-year undeclared war. I realized that simply stating a personal
opinion related to my feelings on the war could upset one or two students whose
sole source of information was highly personalized by a close family member,
and I would not want that to occur.
This concern
actually arose a year or two earlier in an Honors class. We were watching Peter Jennings’ superb 2000
ten-part documentary entitled The Century. This was the 20th century
in photos and interviews with those who lived events, decade by decade. During
the segment involving Viet Nam, several Americans were interviewed, including
Vice Admiral James Stockdale, the longest imprisoned US POW. In the interview, the
Admiral stated that he had been flying over the area in the Gulf of Tonkin
where and at the time which LBJ would later claim a US destroyer was fired upon
by North Vietnamese small craft. He stated categorically that the attack, used
by the Johnson administration as justification for ramping up the war effort,
simply never happened. We know now, based partly on (then LBJ’s SecDef) Bob McNamara’s
soul salvaging attempt in the film, The Fog of War, that the attack, presented
to a national TV audience by LBJ, was fiction and pro-escalation propaganda. After
the video was finished, one female student was very indignant in proclaiming
that the Gulf of Tonkin Incident was “real” because her father who was in the
Navy told her so. (It turned out later that he was stateside at the time.)
Having said
that, let me point out that by that responsible use of truly primary source
information one can get the point across in a much less offensive (or at least
confrontational) manner. This is primarily about Vietnam but has disturbing
parallels to the current Afghan situation. I will use three primary source
telegrams as examples. Because a couple are difficult to read as a I copied
them, I will type the text and attribute it:
First, a telegram from Ho Chi Minh to Harry Truman:
Hanoi February 28 1946
President Hochiminh Vietnam Democratic Republic Hanoi
To the President of the United States of America
Washington, D. C.
On behalf
of Vietnam government and people I beg to inform you that in course of
conversation between Vietnam government and French representatives, the latter
require the secession of Cochinchina (ed: Vietnam) and the return of French
troops in Hanoi. (Stop) Meanwhile French population and troops are making
active preparations for a coup de main (ed: “armed takeover”) in Hanoi
and for military aggression (stop) I therefore most earnestly appeal to you
personally and to the American people to interfere urgently in support of our
independence and help making(sic) the negotiations more in keeping with
of the Atlantic and San Francisco charters’
Respectfully
Hochiminh
(cursive
signature in Latin alphabet)
During the year
prior to his death, FDR had made clear to associates his distaste for the
French dominion in SE Asia and his opposition to allowing it to be reinstated
after the War. Tragically, none of it was written in any sort of policy
document. So: what were the “charters” Ho refers to?
The Atlantic
Charter was a document entered into by FDR and Churchill which called for,
among other principles, an end to colonialism as a by- product of WWII. Most
importantly, both the United States and Great Britain were committed to
supporting the restoration of self-governments for all countries that had been
occupied during the war and allowing all peoples to choose their own
form of government. And…
although a bit grudgingly, Britain did rid itself of India within 2 years,
creating Pakistan, in the process. Ho is simply asking President Truman to hold
the French to that same principle. The second Charter mentioned is the charter
of the United Nations which was signed in San Francisco, in June of 1945, and
also carries negative language related to colonialism. Although signators, several
European colonial powers, especially France, and Belgium, chafed at this.
Belgium, which had been brutally exploitative in the Congo was especially
resistant. France, with significant holdings in Algeria and Southeast Asia was
also hesitant to let go but, in fact, there had been a British presence in
India and the British army, with a significant number of Indian nationals, both
Islamic and Hindu, had defended India throughout. France, on the other hand,
had abandoned Indochina, and now intended to take it back, by force if
necessary.
There is a wide
abyss between what many in the US believed about Vietnam and Ho Chi Minh because
of something we are seeing today, which is the blame game played by the
minority party. One need understand that there was positive, almost ghoulish, private
jubilation among Far-Right Republicans over FDR’s passing, while most Americans,
but not most Republicans, saw him as a minor deity. Stirring the fires of
anti-Communist hysteria became the new Congressional sport and, President by
happenstance, Harry S Truman and his administration, the targets of choice.
Obviously, the Ho telegram was ignored, presumably because of HO’s politics and
Harry Truman’s desire not to look in any
way sympathetic to a communist. The message itself remains a sad example of
what happens when people become secondary to political persuasion.
Through WWII the Democrats held a
significant Congressional majority, as most Americans supported FDR’s conduct
of the war. When The GOP gained control briefly in the 88th
Congress during 1947-49, even such stalwarts as Truman's main foreign policy
advisor 1945-1947, especially regarding the Cold War, and later SecState, Dean
Acheson (slandered by the right as “The Red Dean”) came under the lash of the
GOP Red baiters. There seemed to be a sort of “Wait ‘til Truman has gone
because he sure as hell can’t get elected on his own” spirit among GOP hard
liners, but Democrats regained the majority in 1948, swept along with an
unexpected Truman victory, while Republicans began playing the “Soft on
Communism” card, which game would really gain major league status after
Truman’s surprise 1948 upset win,
But one need
ask, “What did the experts really think was the danger posed by Communism, and
why?” probably the best primary source,
at least an expert opinion, came to Washington in a document known to most
historians as “The Long Telegram.”
George Kennan must be mentioned in this
discussion because he was influential in shaping opinions on dealing with
Communism and the reversing course when his concept became Truman foreign
policy. As Head of Mission In Moscow, Kennan felt that his opinions were being
ignored by Truman and the State department policy wonks. He tried numerous
times to persuade policymakers to abandon plans for cooperation with the Soviet
government in favor of a “sphere of influence” policy in Europe to reduce the
Soviets' power there. Finally, when the Treasury Department posed him a
question regarding Soviet resistance to involvement in the World Bank, on
February 22, 1946, Kennan vented his frustration by sending a lengthy 5,3063-word(!!)
telegram, commonly called "The Long Telegram," from Moscow to
Secretary of State James Byrnes outlining a new strategy for diplomatic
relations with the Soviet Union. In it, he urged that a federation (later
realized as NATO) needed to be established in western Europe to counter Soviet
influence in the region and to compete against the Soviet stronghold in eastern
Europe.
This and other
concepts were outlined in this marathon telegram. Most significantly, perhaps,
was his belief (at the time) that the only way to deal with Soviet dictator
Josef Stalin was to meet strength with strength, which became known as The
Truman Doctrine, of which a central point was the concept of
“Containment”. This became interpreted in
several ways. One, a non-military response, was the Marshall Plan, economically
helping western European war-ravaged nations in the hope they could resist
communist expansionist efforts.
The more critical
point, however, came from a misinterpretation at home that the Soviets were a
danger to attack the USA, and the way to stall such aims was to confront Soviet
efforts in any nation whose security was threatened. Relatively few Americans
ever heard Kennan’s name at the time, as the contents, when released, were
attributed to “X.” The public release of Kennan’s telegram was in the form of
an article written by Kennan as “X” published in “Foreign Affairs” magazine in July
1947. As a prime example of the law of unintended consequences many Americans influenced,
by misinterpretation of Kennan’s focus on the “Red” he knew, Josef Stalin,
immediately ascribed the same characteristics to anyone who had ever call
themselves a communist and, going to the point of the matter, this included HO
Chi Minh and would later include Fidel Castro. It led many to believe that HO
was a pawn of Stalin, instead of what he was - a Vietnamese nationalist who
just wanted to not be under French Colonial political (and worse) economic
dominion.
Reflecting a moment, Americans’ general
willingness to regard Southeast Asians as “children of a lesser God” should not
be all that surprising, considering that just 50 years earlier the US had killed
20,000 Filipino combatants and caused conditions leading to the deaths of more
than ten times that many civilians. The circumstances are sadly familiar. We
(the US) “liberated” the Philippines from Spain and then when they thanked us
and said, “We got it,” we said, “No you don’t, you are incapable of
self-government,” as we had done earlier in Cuba. This reasoning actually
sprung from the US desire to have a major naval base closer to mainland Asia as
the Boxer rebellion on the Chinese mainland was in full swing, and the
realization that ethnic Chinese had evolved into significant influence in
Manila. This Filipino slaughter went on for three years until anti-colonialist Americans
like Mark Twain and others made it such an issue that the decision was made
that they were now fit to live under our supervision until we “granted”
independence in 1946. We had treated Hawaii in similar manner in 1893. Our
arrogance in Afghanistan is simply a continuance, but I digress.
The Truman
Doctrine as this “containment” policy became known, led to Congressional
approval of $400 million of military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey in
1947, the Berlin Airlift, and most significantly, a year later, the $13 billion
Marshall Plan, aimed at rebuilding a free Europe which could withstand Soviet
influences. As the doctrine began to
look more and more as if US military involvement might become an inherent cog
in the machine, George Kennan became fairly vocal in stating that he had meant
economic and social competition, not military involvement, but the cat had left
the bag.
In part, the long telegram said: (after apologizing for the
extreme length of the missive)
“Experience has shown that peaceful and mutually profitable
coexistence of capitalist and socialist states is entirely possible. Basic
internal conflicts in advanced countries are no longer primarily those arising
out of capitalist ownership of means of production but are ones arising from
advanced urbanism and industrialism as such, which Russia has thus far been
spared not by socialism but only by her own backwardness. Internal rivalries of
capitalism do not always generate wars; and not all wars are attributable to
this cause. To speak of possibility of intervention against USSR today,
after elimination of Germany and Japan and after example of recent war, is
sheerest nonsense. If not provoked by forces of intolerance and subversion,
"capitalist" world of today is quite capable of living at peace with
itself and with Russia. Finally, no sane person has reason to doubt sincerity of
moderate socialist leaders in Western countries. Nor is it fair to deny success
of their efforts to improve conditions for working population whenever, as in
Scandinavia, they have been given chance to show what they could do.”
Somewhat overlooked is this later paragraph which argues
against military intervention, a position Kennan retreated to later in life.
And this: We
must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I
cannot over-emphasize importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must
be done mainly by Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better
informed on practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by
[ugliness?] of picture. I am convinced that there would be far less
hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this
situation were better understood by our people.
Although just a
sample of this massive document, it conveys what I feel was Kennan’s “lost”
message (I paraphrase) “The Russians will continue trying to convince others of
the value of their system, but it really has huge flaws and like capitalism,
internal disputes as well.” Taken as a whole, I read it as “Stalin’s a
power-hungry asshole but he has enough problems at home to deal with and most
Russians are decent folks.” Sadly, many
on the Right viewed it as “All Communists are just like Stalin and any local
communist effort anywhere is directed from Moscow.” Gradually, a sort of the
“Reds are everywhere” began to take shape, and anyone who had ever considered
Communism/Socialism even as simply a political exercise (people like Lucille Ball,
who went to one Communist meeting in the 1930s) came under suspicion.
As a final
Kennan critique: One of his assertions was that there was no provision for
orderly Soviet leadership succession, which was belied by Nikita Khrushchev’s
assumption of leadership after Stalin’s death. While Stalin gloried in his
military past and was almost never photographed out of uniform, Khrushchev always
appeared in business dress, stressing a “bloodless” transition to civilian
leadership, in 1953, which probably surprised Kennan and a host of others.
In early 1950,
two events occurred which reflect not only the Red Scare, but the
politicization of it. The first is a telegram from a failing Senator from
Wisconsin, who, desperate to win his next election, and (it’s true) at the
advice of his priest made some claims which rattled America.
The President the White House 1950, February 11
“In a Lincoln Day dinner at Wheeling (W.VA) Thursday
night, I stated that the State Department harbors a nest of Communists and
Communist sympathizers who are helping to shape our Foreign policy. I further
stated that I have in my possession, the names of 57 Communists who ae in the
State department at present”
This telegram from
Senator Joseph McCarthy, and his actions in Wheeling generated incendiary waves
of “Red baiting” and generally baseless allegations. Both Truman and later
Eisenhower loathed McCarthy, but the anti-Red tide was a political juggernaut.
I will, for the sake of brevity (yeah, I know, too late) leave non-foreign
policy issues aside, although there were many.
The second
event happened halfway around the world just 4 months later, as North Korean
communist troops, supported by the opportunistic Chinese and Soviets, invaded
South Korea. Following Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945, the United States
and the Soviet Union divided Korea along the 38th parallel into two zones of
occupation, with the Soviets administering the northern zone and the Americans
the southern zone. In 1948, as Cold War tensions escalated, the occupation
zones became two sovereign states. A capitalist state, the Republic of Korea,
was established in the south under the leadership of Syngman Rhee, and a
socialist state, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was established in
the north under the Communist and drastically totalitarian leadership of Kim
Il-sung.
Both governments of the two new Korean states claimed to be the sole
legitimate government of all of Korea, and neither accepted the border as
permanent. In other words, the US and USSR had split Korea into “our guys” and
“their guys.” No elections, no conferences, just two western powers dictating
Asian policy. This was compounded by the elephant in the room, the newly
established People’s Republic of China, also militantly communist. In June,
1950, North Korean military crossed onto the South and rapidly drove the South Korean
army and US occupation forces to a last ditch stand at the Southern end if the
Korean Peninsula.
President Truman
believed if aggression went unchecked, a chain reaction would be initiated that
would marginalize the UN and encourage Communist aggression elsewhere. Another major concern was the security of Japan, also
a capitalist US post-war occupation nation. The US immediately began using air
and naval forces that were in the area to that end. The Truman administration
still hesitated to commit more troops on the ground because some advisers
believed the North Koreans could be stopped by air and naval power alone. Since
US occupation troops were under increasingly heavy fire, and after receiving a (still
unattributed publicly) communique assuring that Soviet troops would not oppose
US troops in Korea, Truman sent US troops to help the South. Soon after, a UN
Security Council resolution denouncing the Northern aggression, passed in the
absence of a Soviet representative, led to UN troops from various nations
ultimately involved, but the majority of non-Korean troops were American.
Skipping the numerous and gory details, the Korean War ended in a stalemate after
3 years of slaughter, in July 1953. Most Americans had and still have no idea
that there were several options which included nuclear weapons considered by
both Truman and, later, Eisenhower.
Of course,
anti-Communist sentiment in the US was used by some for political gain. Joseph
McCarthy took full advantage of this via many questionable and controversial tactics
to become chair of the Senate Government Operations committee by 1953.
Meanwhile,
across the Pacific, the French had been attempting to reassert dominion in
Vietnam and were being met with surprising (to them) resistance. Some American
politicians were eager to note that the opposition to the French occupation was
led by the Ho Chi Minh who they loudly pointed out was a Communist. As previously
noted, to many this meant he was Stalin, Mao and Kim all rolled into one. In
truth he was far less doctrinaire and far more concerned with independence for
his nation. The fact that the Vietnamese
were rigorously defending their turf became an increasing concern to US
Politicians, while s most US citizens at the time had no idea of where or what
Vietnam was. One awkward issue was that the Vietnamese Vietminh party who
resisted Japan and were US WWII allies, were also receiving Soviet weapons to
use against the French, and the French Republic had a steady and increasing
French Communist party at home to contend with. This led to US chucking the
Vietminh under the bus and supporting the French puppet monarchy.
The United
States decision to provide military assistance to France and the Associated States
of Indochina was reached informally in February/March 1950, funded by the
President on May 1, 1950, and was announced on May 8 of that year. Later
authorizations involved US air power, Naval forces, and military advisors. CIA
operatives were in place by1953. Even so, between March 13 and May 7, 1954, Vietminh
forces supported by some Soviet advisors and material, defeated the French
occupation army, supported by US airpower and financing and what amounted to
Southeast Asian mercenaries, at Dien Bien Phu.
The Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954,
recognized the 17th parallel north as a "provisional military demarcation
line", temporarily dividing the country into two zones, communist North Vietnam,
and pro-Western South Vietnam. Note this line from the Geneva treaty: “The
Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of
hostilities in Viet-Nam prohibiting the introduction into Viet-Nam of foreign
troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions.” And: “The Conference declares
that, so far as Viet-Nam is concerned. the settlement of political problems,
effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and
territorial integrity, shall permit the Viet-Namese people to enjoy the
fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a
result of free general elections by secret ballot”
Long story short (I know, too late):
20 July 1956 was
the date specified in the Geneva Accords for national elections to re-unify
North and South Vietnam. The elections were not held because (new) President
Diem said South Vietnam was not a party to the Accords. Earlier local elections
had been skewed by armed intimidation of villagers assisted by US CIA advisors.
Most observers believe that Ho Chi Minh
would have won the elections easily. In fact, President Dwight Eisenhower stated
that he was sure “"If the elections had been held in 1956, Ho Chi Minh
would have won 80 percent of the vote." Viewing that the South had ignored
the Geneva Convention requirements and would never allow true national
elections, The North declared war on the South’s regime. At this point, the US decided
to get involved in a war to maintain an illegal regime and disallow free
elections. Why? Because Ho was a communist. Despite what the world had decided,
we then decided that some people, especially Asians, apparently, should not be
allowed to decide the direction of their nation by democratic processes.
From that time
forward, US involvement, including the overthrow of one South Vietnamese leader
and the assassination of another revolved around several issues, including the
fact that many rural Vietnamese had always supported Ho and that South Vietnamese
leaders were blatantly corrupt. Add tribalism, ignoring the welfare of many
citizens and a national military more than a bit unwilling to defend the nation
and it all leads to the eventual “declare victory and leave” Nixon decision in
1975, just 2 million deaths later.
Sound familiar
yet? It should, because we, as a nation are slow learners. In many ways, the failure
of foreign policy aimed at telling a mixed population what they should do and
believe in Southeast Asia is equally ill advised in Central Asia. In case you
missed it, we’ve been practicing for the evacuation of Afghanistan for well over
a century. One difference, President Biden pulled us out of this rabbit hole, knowing
that doing the right thing is frequently not easy, or even popular, but it is always
justified.
