Parallels

 

                                       Parallels

 

          Recent events in Florida’s public schools regarding what to teach (or not) and how to teach it have made me reexamine this essay. It contains some history of which many are either unaware or uncertain. Yes, it’s long, yes it’s informative. 

        The issue of teaching critical race theory (or not) has an earlier parallel, at least for me as an older History teacher. That was the issue of US involvement in Southeast Asia. I had enlisted in the US Navy in 1964, in large part because I believed the US involvement in Vietnam to be misguided and flawed policy (and my draft number was up). 34 years later, as an Advanced Placement United States (APUS) History teacher, I sometimes had students whose fathers or other male relatives had been personally involved in that 20-year undeclared war.  I realized that simply stating a personal opinion related to my feelings on the war could upset one or two students whose sole source of information was highly personalized by a close family member, and I would not want that to occur.

        This concern actually arose a year or two earlier in an Honors class.  We were watching Peter Jennings’ superb 2000 ten-part documentary entitled The Century. This was the 20^th century in photos and interviews with those who lived events, decade by decade. During the segment involving Viet Nam, several Americans were interviewed, including Vice Admiral James Stockdale, the longest imprisoned US POW. In the interview, the Admiral stated that he had been flying over the area in the Gulf of Tonkin where and at the time which LBJ would later claim a US destroyer was fired upon by North Vietnamese small craft. He stated categorically that the attack, used by the Johnson administration as justification for ramping up the war effort, simply never happened. We know now, based partly on (then LBJ’s SecDef) Bob McNamara’s soul salvaging attempt in the film, “The Fog of War”, that the attack, presented to a national TV audience by LBJ, was fiction and pro-escalation propaganda. After the video was finished, one female student was very indignant in proclaiming that the Gulf of Tonkin Incident was “real” because her father who was in the Navy told her so. (It turns out later that he was stateside at the time.)  

        Having said that, let me point out that by responsible use of truly primary source information one can get the point across in a much less offensive (or at least non confrontational) manner. This is primarily about Vietnam but has disturbing parallels to the current Afghan situation. I will use three primary source telegrams as examples. Because a couple are difficult to read as a I copied them, I will type the text and attribute it:     

First, a telegram from Ho Chi Minh to Harry Truman:

Hanoi February 28 1946

President Hochiminh Vietnam Democratic Republic Hanoi

To the President of the United States of America Washington, D. C.

        On behalf of Vietnam government and people I beg to inform you that in course of conversation between Vietnam government and French representatives, the latter require the secession of Cochinchina (ed: Vietnam) and the return of French troops in Hanoi. (stop) Meanwhile French population and troops are making active preparations for a coup de main (ed: “armed takeover”) in Hanoi and for military aggression (stop) I therefore most earnestly appeal to you personally and to the American people to interfere urgently in support of our independence and help making(sic) the negotiations more in keeping with of the Atlantic and San Francisco charters.

                                   Respectfully

                                             Hochiminh

                       (cursive signature in Latin alphabet)

        During the year prior to his death, FDR had made clear to associates his distaste for the French dominion in SE Asia and his opposition to allowing it to be reinstated after the War. Tragically, none of it was written in any sort of policy document. So: what were the “charters” Ho refers to?     

        The Atlantic Charter was a document entered into by FDR and Churchill which called for, among other principles, an end to colonialism as a by- product of WWII. Most importantly, both the United States and Great Britain were committed to supporting the restoration of self-governments for all countries that had been occupied during the war and allowing all peoples to choose their own form of government.  And… although a bit grudgingly, Britain did rid itself of India within 2 years, creating Pakistan, in the process. Ho is simply asking President Truman to hold the French to that same principle. The second Charter mentioned is the Charter of the United Nations which was signed in San Francisco, in June of 1945, and also carries negative language related to colonialism. Although signators, several European colonial powers, especially France, and Belgium, chafed at this. Belgium, which had been brutally exploitative in the Congo was especially resistant. France, with significant holdings in Algeria and Southeast Asia was also hesitant to let go, but in fact, there had been a British presence in India and the British army, with a significant number of Indian nationals, both Islamic and Hindu, had defended India throughout. France, on the other hand, had abandoned Indochina, and now intended to take it back, by force if necessary.

        There is a wide abyss between what many in the US believed about Vietnam and Ho Chi Minh because of something we are seeing today, which is the blame game played by the minority party. One need understand that there was positive, almost ghoulish, private jubilation among some Far-Right Republicans over FDR’s passing, while most Americans, but not most Republicans, saw him as a minor deity. Stirring the fires of anti-Communist hysteria became the new Congressional sport and, President by happenstance, Harry S. Truman and his administration, the targets of choice. Obviously, the Ho telegram was ignored, presumably because of HO’s politics and Harry Truman’s desire not to look in any way sympathetic to a communist. The message itself and the fact that the US ignored it, remains a sad example of what happens when people become secondary to political persuasion. Millions would die as a result.

        Through WWII the Democrats held a significant Congressional majority, as most Americans supported FDR’s conduct of the war.       When The GOP gained control briefly in the 88^th Congress during 1947-49, even such stalwarts as Truman's main foreign policy advisor 1945-1947 and later SecState, Dean Acheson, (slandered by the right as “The Red Dean”) came under the lash of the GOP Red baiters. There seemed to be a sort of “Wait ‘til Truman has gone because he sure as hell can’t get elected on his own” spirit among GOP hard liners, but Democrats regained the majority in 1948, swept along with an unexpected Truman victory, while Republicans began playing the “Soft on Communism” card, which game would really gain major league status after Truman’s surprise 1948 upset win,    

        But one need ask, “What did the experts really think was the danger posed by Communism, and why?”  Probably the best primary source, at least an expert opinion, came to Washington in a document known to most historians as “The Long Telegram.”

        George Kennan must be mentioned in this discussion because he was influential in shaping opinions on dealing with Communism and then reversing course when his concept became Truman foreign policy. As Head of Mission In Moscow, Kennan felt that his opinions were being ignored by Truman and the State department policy wonks. He tried numerous times to persuade policymakers to abandon plans for cooperation with the Soviet government in favor of a “sphere of influence” policy in Europe to reduce the Soviets' power there.

        Finally, when the Treasury Department posed him a question regarding Soviet resistance to involvement in the World Bank, on February 22, 1946, Kennan vented his frustration by sending a lengthy 5,3063-word(!!) telegram, commonly called "The Long Telegram," from Moscow to Secretary of State James Byrnes, outlining a new strategy for diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In it, he urged that a federation (later realized as NATO) needed to be established in western Europe to counter Soviet influence in the region and to compete against the Soviet stronghold in eastern Europe.

        This and other concepts were outlined in this marathon telegram. Most significant, perhaps, was his belief (at the time) that the only way to deal with Soviet dictator Josef Stalin was to meet strength with strength, which became known as The Truman Doctrine, of which a central point was the concept of “Containment”.  This became interpreted in several ways. One, a non-military response, was the brilliant, if costly, Marshall Plan, economically helping western European war-ravaged nations in the hope they could resist communist expansionist efforts.

        The more critical point, however, came from a misinterpretation at home that the Soviets were a danger to attack the USA, and the way to stall such aims was to confront Soviet efforts in any nation whose security was threatened. Relatively few Americans ever heard Kennan’s name at the time, as the contents, when released, were attributed to “X.” The public release of Kennan’s telegram was in the form of an article written by Kennan as “X” published in “Foreign Affairs” magazine in July 1947.

As a prime example of the law of unintended consequences many Americans influenced, by misinterpretation of Kennan’s focus on the “Red” he knew, Josef Stalin, immediately ascribed the same characteristics to anyone who had ever called themselves a communist or even just a Socialist and, going to the point of the matter, this included Ho Chi Minh and would later include Fidel Castro. It led many to believe that Ho was a pawn of Stalin, instead of what he actually was - a Vietnamese nationalist who just wanted to not be under French Colonial political, and worse, economic dominion.     

        Reflecting a moment, Americans’ general willingness to regard Southeast Asians as “children of a lesser God” should not be all that surprising, considering that just 50 years earlier the US had killed 20,000 Filipino combatants and caused conditions leading to the deaths of more than ten times that many civilians. The circumstances are sadly familiar. We (the US) “liberated” the Philippines from Spain and then when they thanked us and said, “We got it,” we said, “No you don’t, you are incapable of self-government,” as we had done earlier in Cuba. This reasoning actually sprung from the US desire to have a major naval base closer to mainland Asia as the Boxer rebellion on the Chinese mainland was in full swing, and the realization that ethnic Chinese had evolved into significant influence in Manila.

This Filipino slaughter went on for three years until anti-colonialist Americans like Mark Twain and others made it such an issue that the decision was made that they were now fit to live under our supervision until we “granted” independence in 1946. We had treated Hawaii in similar manner in 1893. Our arrogance in Afghanistan is simply a continuance, but I digress.

        The Truman Doctrine as this “containment” policy became known, led to Congressional approval of $400 million of military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947, the Berlin Airlift, and most significantly, a year later, the $13 billion Marshall Plan, aimed at rebuilding a free Europe which could withstand Soviet influences.  As the doctrine began to look more and more as if US military involvement might become an inherent cog in the machine, George Kennan became fairly vocal in stating that he had meant economic and social competition, not military involvement, but the cat had left the bag.   

In part, the long telegram said: (after Kennan’s opening apology for the extreme length of the missive)

“Experience has shown that peaceful and mutually profitable coexistence of capitalist and socialist states is entirely possible. Basic internal conflicts in advanced countries are no longer primarily those arising out of capitalist ownership of means of production but are ones arising from advanced urbanism and industrialism as such, which Russia has thus far been spared not by socialism but only by her own backwardness. Internal rivalries of capitalism do not always generate wars; and not all wars are attributable to this cause. To speak of possibility of intervention against USSR today, after elimination of Germany and Japan and after example of recent war, is sheerest nonsense. If not provoked by forces of intolerance and subversion, "capitalist" world of today is quite capable of living at peace with itself and with Russia. Finally, no sane person has reason to doubt sincerity of moderate socialist leaders in Western countries. Nor is it fair to deny success of their efforts to improve conditions for working population whenever, as in Scandinavia, they have been given chance to show what they could do.”

Somewhat overlooked is this later paragraph which argues against military intervention, a position Kennan retreated to by the late 1940s.

And this:  We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I cannot over-emphasize importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by [ugliness?] of picture. I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people.

        Although just a sample of this massive document, it conveys what I feel was Kennan’s “lost” message (I paraphrase) “The Russians will continue trying to convince others of the value of their system, but it really has huge flaws and like capitalism, internal disputes as well.” Taken as a whole, I read it as “Stalin’s a power-hungry asshole but he has enough problems at home to deal with and most Russians are decent folks.”  Sadly, many on the Right viewed it as “All Communists are just like Stalin and any local communist effort anywhere is directed from Moscow.” Gradually, a sort of the “Reds are everywhere” hysteria began to take shape, and anyone who had ever considered Communism/Socialism even as simply a political exercise (people like Lucille Ball, who went to one Communist meeting in the 1930s) came under suspicion.

        As a final Kennan critique: One of his assertions was that there was no provision for orderly Soviet leadership succession, which was belied by Nikita Khrushchev’s assumption of leadership after Stalin’s death. While Stalin gloried in his military past and was almost never photographed out of uniform, Khrushchev always appeared in business dress, stressing a “bloodless” transition to civilian leadership, in 1953, which probably surprised Kennan and a host of others.   

        In early 1950, two events occurred which reflect not only the Red Scare, but the politicization of it. The first is a telegram from a failing Senator from Wisconsin, who, desperate to win his next election, and (it’s true) on the advice of his priest, made some claims which rattled America.        

 

The President the White House 1950, February 11

“In a Lincoln Day dinner at Wheeling (W.VA) Thursday night, I stated that the State Department harbors a nest of Communists and Communist sympathizers who are helping to shape our Foreign policy. I further stated that I have in my possession, the names of 57 Communists who are in the State department at present”

        This telegram from Senator Joseph McCarthy, and his actions in Wheeling generated incendiary waves of “Red baiting” and generally baseless allegations. Both Truman and later Eisenhower loathed McCarthy, but the anti-Red tide was a political juggernaut. I will, for the sake of brevity (yeah, I know, too late) leave non-foreign policy issues aside, although there were many.    

       The second event happened halfway around the world just 4 months later, as North Korean communist troops, supported by the opportunistic Chinese and Soviets, invaded South Korea. Following Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union divided Korea along the 38th parallel into two zones of occupation, with the Soviets administering the northern zone and the Americans the southern zone. In 1948, as Cold War tensions escalated, the occupation zones became two sovereign states. A capitalist state, the Republic of Korea, was established in the south under the leadership of Syngman Rhee, and a socialist state, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was established in the north under the Communist and drastically totalitarian leadership of Kim Il-sung.

        Both governments of the two new Korean states claimed to be the sole legitimate government of all of Korea, and neither accepted the border as permanent. In other words, the US and USSR had split Korea into “our guys” and “their guys.” No elections, no conferences, just two western powers dictating Asian policy. This was compounded by the elephant in the room, the newly established People’s Republic of China, also militantly Communist. In June, 1950, North Korean military crossed onto the South and rapidly drove the South Korean army and US occupation forces to a last ditch stand at Pusan, near the southern end of the Korean Peninsula.

        President Truman believed if aggression went unchecked, a chain reaction would be initiated that would marginalize the UN and encourage Communist aggression elsewhere. Another major concern was the security of Japan, still a capitalist and US post-war occupied nation. The US immediately began using air and naval forces that were in the area to that end. The Truman administration still hesitated to commit more troops on the ground because some advisers believed the North Koreans could be stopped by air and naval power alone. Since US occupation troops were under increasingly heavy fire, and after receiving a (still unattributed publicly) communique assuring that Soviet troops would not oppose US troops in Korea, Truman sent US troops to help the South. Soon after, a UN Security Council resolution denouncing the Northern aggression, passed in the absence of a Soviet representative, led to UN troops from various nations being ultimately involved, but the majority of non- South Korean troops were American. Skipping the numerous and gory details, the Korean War ended in a stalemate after 3 years of slaughter, in July 1953. Most Americans had, and still have, no idea that there were several options which included nuclear weapons actively considered by both Truman and, later, Eisenhower.    

        Of course, anti-Communist sentiment in the US was used by some for political gain. Joseph McCarthy took full advantage of this via many questionable and controversial tactics to become chair of the Senate Government Operations committee by 1953.

        Meanwhile, across the Pacific, the French, consistent with Ho’s pleading telex, had been attempting to reassert dominion in Vietnam and were being met with surprising (to them) resistance. Some American politicians were eager to note that the opposition to the French occupation was led by Ho Chi Minh who they loudly pointed out was a Communist. As previously noted, to many this meant he was Stalin, Mao and Kim all rolled into one. In truth he was far less doctrinaire and far more concerned with independence for his nation.  The fact that the Vietnamese were rigorously defending their own turf became an increasing concern to US Politicians as most US citizens at the time had no idea of where or what Vietnam was. One awkward issue was that the Vietnamese Vietminh party who resisted Japan and were US WWII allies, were also receiving Soviet weapons to use against the French, and the French Republic had a steady and increasing French Communist party at home to contend with. This led to US chucking the Vietminh under the bus and supporting the French puppet monarchy.    

        The United States decision to provide military assistance to France and the Associated States of Indochina was reached informally in February/March 1950, funded by the President on May 1, 1950, and was announced on May 8 of that year. Later authorizations involved US air power, Naval forces, and military advisors. CIA operatives had been in place as early as 1947, and by 1953 were actively engaged in covert actions against the Vietminh. Even so, between March 13 and May 7, 1954, Vietminh forces supported by some Soviet advisors and material, defeated the French occupation army, supported by US airpower and financing and what amounted to Southeast Asian mercenaries, at Dien Bien Phu.

         The Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954, recognized the 17th parallel north as a "provisional military demarcation line", temporarily dividing the country into two zones, communist North Vietnam, and pro-Western South Vietnam. Note this line from the Geneva treaty: “The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam prohibiting the introduction into Viet-Nam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions.”  And: “The Conference declares that, so far as Viet-Nam is concerned. the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Viet-Namese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot”

Long story short (I know, too late):

        20 July 1956 was the date specified in the Geneva Accords for national elections to re-unify North and South Vietnam. The elections were not held because (new) President Diem said South Vietnam was not a party to the Accords. Earlier local elections had been skewed by armed intimidation of villagers assisted by US CIA advisors.  Most observers believe that Ho Chi Minh would have won the elections easily. In fact, President Dwight Eisenhower stated that he was sure “"If the elections had been held in 1956, Ho Chi Minh would have won 80 percent of the vote." Viewing that the South had ignored the Geneva Convention requirements and would never allow true national elections, The North declared war on the South’s regime. At this point, the US decided to get involved in a war to maintain an illegal regime and disallow free elections. Why? Because Ho was a communist. Despite what the world had decided, we then decided that some people, especially Asians, apparently, should not be allowed to decide the direction of their nation by democratic processes.

        From that time forward, US involvement, including the overthrow of one South Vietnamese leader and the assassination of another revolved around several issues, including the fact that many rural Vietnamese had always supported Ho and that South Vietnamese leaders were blatantly corrupt. Add tribalism, ignoring the welfare of many citizens and a national military more than a bit unwilling to defend the nation and it all leads to the eventual “declare victory and leave” Nixon decision in 1975, just 2 million deaths later.  

        Sound familiar yet? It should, because we, as a nation are slow learners. In many ways, the failure of foreign policy aimed at telling a mixed population what they should do and believe in Southeast Asia is equally ill advised in Central Asia. In case you missed it, we’ve been practicing for the evacuation of Afghanistan for well over a century. One difference, President Biden pulled us out of this rabbit hole, knowing that doing the right thing is frequently not easy, or even popular, but it is always justified.