Monday, August 16, 2021

Graveyard of Empires

 

    In his latest senile bloviation in what has become a sickening stream of “I can’t believe I really lost” vitriolic nonsense, Trump has called for President Biden to “resign in disgrace.”

        Apparently, this latest blast of low-grade excreta stems from the collapse of the Afghan government as Taliban forces take back control of most of the country and Trump’s determination to continue his efforts to undermine Democracy here at home.

        To truly understand just how ludicrous it is to blame the Biden Administration for this latest chapter of Mid-East misery a history lesson is in order. C’mon, you knew it was coming, didn’t you? To understand how consistently Afghanistan has bled the coffers and forces of other nations in just the last two centuries requires going back to the mid-19th century.

        for most of the 19th century, Russia was seen as "the enemy" in Britain; and any Russian advance into Central Asia, into what is now Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, was always assumed (in London) to be directed towards the conquest of India.  An American historian, David Fromkin, once observed, "no matter how far-fetched" such an interpretation might be.  A closer examination would show that the extremely powerful, and mega-connected in Parliament, British East India Company, which was the de facto ruler of India, feared any perturbation of the region on or even near the Indian Border to the North. I have leaped over decades of minor altercations here, but against the warnings of such actual military “pros” such as the Duke of Wellington, who knew a little about war, having defeated Napoleon, the British entered Afghanistan in March 1839. By early 1843 they left in tatters with the army fragmented, the British death toll undetermined but in the thousands. They would do it again in 1879, gaining control but only until they left two years later.

        In both wars, Russia was a non-participant and of no military consequence regardless of British concerns to the opposite at the time. It is noteworthy that neither British adventure was justified by any overt act against British citizens or challenges to British sovereignty, but more from a sort of “what they might do” paranoia.

        From 1901 to 1919 an authoritarian Afghan ruler  balanced Russia and Britain against one another and remained neutral in WWI in spite of Turkish pressures to support their Muslim brothers. There was still significant political interest, in retrospect unjustified, about which European nation influenced Afghan issues.  

        That is, until 1918, when, with Britain occupied in the War and Russia in revolutionary chaos, Amanullah Khan came to power just as the entente between Russia and Britain broke down following the Russian Revolution of 1917. Anxious to modernize and industrialize his country and rid it of all foreign influence, Amanullah wanted to shore up his powerbase by diverting attention from the internal (and sectarian) divisions within  Afghanistan and unite all faction behind him by attacking the British.  He used civil unrest in India as an excuse to move troops to the Indian border, crossing into India western end of the Khyber Pass on 3 May 1919 and occupied the village of Bagh, the scene of an earlier uprising in April. In response, the Indian (British) government ordered a full mobilization and, on 6 May 1919, declared war. By August, the British, tired of war, and in no mood to bargain, used aircraft and modern weapons to subdue the Afghans, ending hostilities with the Anglo-Afghan Treaty, which was essentially dictated by Britain, but did give the Afghans considerable scope of political liberty to enter into foreign agreements. This included formal diplomatic relations with the new government of the Soviet Union in 1919. During the 1920s, Afghanistan established diplomatic relations with most major countries.

        Through the 1920s as Amanullah continued attempts to modernize, he spent increasing amounts of time in Europe as more traditional religious opposition began to grow. Among these actions was declaring himself King in 1926, ending the (Islamic) Emirate status of many years leading to his eventual abdication in 1929, and temporary exile in India. After a failed attempted return to Afghanistan and finding that he had little support from the people, the ex-king traveled to Europe and settled in Italy, and later in Switzerland. His successor was assassinated in 1933. The new ruler, Mohammed Zahir Shah remained the titular head of the nation until 1973.

        On a per capita basis, Afghanistan received more Soviet development aid than any other country. Consequently, Afghanistan had, therefore, good relations with the  both US and the USSR, Cold War enemies. In 1973, while the King was in Italy, Daoud Khan launched a bloodless coup and became the first President of Afghanistan, abolishing the monarchy. This was to be short lived, as in April of 1978, the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized power in a bloody coup d'état. This now provided a pretext for Soviet support of the new government as a “brother Communist nation”. It also set up the conflict between government and religious conservatives, as Communism and Islam are vastly divergent philosophies.

          This philosophical/political unrest deteriorated into Afghan civil war by 1979, waged by guerrilla mujahideen (ultra conservative Taliban and smaller Maoist guerilla groups) against government regime forces countrywide.  In September 1979, the Soviet backed General Secretary was assassinated in an internal coup orchestrated by then-Prime minister Hafizullah Amin, who assumed the role of general secretary of the People's Democratic Party. Displeased with Amin's government, the Soviet Army invaded the country in December 1979, headed for Kabul, killed Amin, and installed a government organized by and beholden to the Soviets. Thus began the Soviet-Afghan War.

        In brief, Soviet troops in more substantial numbers were deployed to stabilize Afghanistan. The United States and Pakistan, along with smaller actors like Saudi Arabia and China, continued supporting the rebels, delivering billions of dollars in cash and weapons including two thousand FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air missiles, terrific Soviet Chopper killers. 

        Lasting nine years, the war caused the deaths of between 562,000 and 2 million Afghans and 50,000 Soviets killed or injured  and displaced about 6 million people who subsequently fled Afghanistan, mainly to Pakistan and Iran. Heavy air bombardment destroyed many villages, millions of landmines were planted, and some cities such as Herat and Kandahar were badly damaged from bombardment.

     Pakistan's North-West frontier province functioned as an organizational and networking base for the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance, with the province's influential Conservative Muslims playing a major supporting role in promoting the 'jihad', which for  Mujahedeen splinter groups like the ultra-conservative Taliban, it had been all along.  After the Soviet withdrawal, civil war ensued until the communist regime under People's Democratic Party leader Mohammad Najibullah collapsed in 1992.

        What followed was the internal effort of the Taliban to kick the nation backward to Islamic fundamentalism, which also meant an open door in Taliban controlled regions for terrorists such as Osama Bin Laden, Saudi by birth, anti-American terrorist by vocation. By early 2001 most of Afghanistan was controlled by the repressive Taliban as a Fundamentalist Islamic state under Sharia law. This still might have remained an internal problem had not Bin Laden attacked the US on our own turf, which, as we all will never forget, was done by his minions on September 11, 2001.

         In October 2001, the United States invaded Afghanistan to remove the Taliban from power after they refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden, the architect of the September 11 attacks, who was a "guest" of the Taliban and was operating his al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan. The majority of Afghans supported the American invasion of their country. Thus, for the third time in ten years without a declaration of War, US troops would again engage in the Mideast. The 2001 US incursion removed the Taliban from power and led to the establishment of a democratic government in those areas not under Taliban control.  

        Sadly, it also led to Bin Laden being allowed to flee to Pakistan, in December 2001, based on a SecDef Rumsfeld decision not to commit ground forces at Tora Bora where he had been holed up. He would later be killed in Pakistan in 2011 on the orders of President Obama. Understand that: Osama Bin Laden, the stated reason for the Bush decision to invade Afghanistan, was gone, gone, gone, before 2002!  The number of NATO troops present in Afghanistan peaked at 140,000 in 2011, dropping to about 16,000 in 2018. US troop levels fluctuated between 7.000 and 14,000 over the next fifteen years.

        As withdrawals continued, Taliban influence increased. As the nation is 99.7 Islamic, religious fanaticism is an easier sell than in many other places, Additionally, What the US has not said plainly and openly enough to my mind is to point out the Pakistani involvement in support of the Taliban and Bin Laden.

        As for Trump’s posturing, remember, his latest official opinion while President was that Desert Storm was a mistake, and a younger Trump used fake bone spurs to avoid Viet Nam service. This might make one think he would welcome withdrawal from Afghanistan, but probably not, if there is any chance to malign President Biden. Trump has so little foreign policy comprehension (the opinion of his former National Security Advisor) as to be dangerous.

        Opinion (Mine): remaining in Afghanistan after Bin Laden had fled to Pakistan, where he was killed in a covert military strike, was a Bush 43 mistake, as was the “weapons of mass destruction fraud” Iraq invasion. It was reminiscent of US Viet Nam involvement, which cost more than 2 million lives and yes, I count the Vietnamese who died, because they’re just as dead.

        Afghanistan is a notoriously difficult country to govern. Empire after empire, nation after nation have failed to pacify what is today the modern territory of Afghanistan, giving the region the nickname “Graveyard of Empires.” Attempting to overcome centuries of tribalism and religious zealotry is a task which should not be undertaken by non-believers 8000 miles away because it is a fool’s errand. Whatever happens in Afghanistan will be a continuance of decades old beliefs and conditions and will only (if ever) change when the vast majority of the indigenous population say “enough.”  It will probably not be anytime soon, as Iran has proven, but with a population with a literacy rate of just 47% (higher for males lower for females) it is even more unlikely. Afghanistan may not see their situation improve anytime in the near future. Hampered by tribalism and restrained by fundamentalist and draconian religious concepts it’s a long road, but one on which the US has no business.

        Final note: When Saigon collapsed, one issue was the poor efforts a defense exhibited by some South Vietnamese military. The same is being said of Afghani defense forces - that they just “rolled up” before the Taliban.

 Data:  President George W. Bush cut tax rates for the wealthiest, rather than raise them, at outset of Afghanistan and Iraq wars:   

Estimated amount of direct Afghanistan and Iraq war costs that the United States has debt financed as of 2020: $2 trillion.

Estimated interest costs by 2050: Up to $6.5 trillion.

Estimates of US commitments to pay in health care, disability, burial, and other costs for roughly 4 million Afghanistan and Iraq veterans: more than $2 trillion.


Sometimes what is right is, perhaps, unpopular, but still right. 


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