March Madness

 

The recent and continuing strikes on Iran have the effect of becoming a kind of geopolitical Rorschach test: everyone involved sees what they want to see, while the inkblot itself is unmistakably dark, ugly, and poorly defined. The U.S.–Israeli operation has moved far beyond “surgical” and into the realm of regime‑shaping warfare, and Iran’s retaliation has turned the Persian Gulf into a live‑fire zone stretching from Doha to the Strait of Hormuz.

        Flash back to Operation Desert Storm, when, at Dick Cheney’s suggestion, Bush 41 eschewed “regime building.” Key advisors, most notably Joint Chiefs Chairman General Colin Powell and Sec Def Dick Cheney, urged President George H.W. Bush not to go to Baghdad or remove Saddam Hussein from power during the 1991 Gulf War. They advised that invading Baghdad would create a power vacuum, require massive troop commitments, lead to a "quagmire," and split the international coalition. Five weeks later it was over, Kuwait was freed and we came home, less about 300 fewer US soldiers.

H.W.’s more malleable son, encouraged by the revised opinion of then Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and amplified by fabricated tales of weapons of mass destruction, later initiated a regime change attempt in Iraq which resulted in over 8,000 dead US troops and 32,000 wounded.

In both cases, it was Coalition troops vs a Middle East state. In the current instance the conflict is not only The US vs Iran, but there is also a centuries old underlying theme of Islamic sectarian hatred/mutual disrespect between Sunni and Shiite adherents.  Sectarian identity is a regional political tool in much the same way as the Crusades were 900 years ago. Shia–Sunni divides are more than seven hundred years old, but in modern geopolitics they’re often used as branding, not belief. Governments invoke sectarian identity the way corporations invoke “family values” — loudly, selectively, and usually when they want something.

While Iran positions itself as the champion of Shia communities across the region, from Lebanon to Iraq to Yemen, Saudi Arabia and several Gulf states cast themselves as defenders of Sunni order against Iranian influence.

Militias and political parties across the region use sectarian labels to secure funding, legitimacy, and weapons. This doesn’t mean the theological divide isn’t real — it is — but the political use of it is often opportunistic rather than doctrinal. The current kerfuffle fits that pattern.

The attacks on Iran and the subsequent regional escalation have revived old sectarian narratives, but in ways that reveal how flexible they are when power is at stake. Sunni-majority Gulf states are condemning Iran’s retaliation while simultaneously trying to avoid being dragged into a war they didn’t ask for. Shia communities in Iraq and Lebanon are split, as their populations’ sectarian tenets are. Some see Iran as a protector, others as a reckless actor endangering them as collateral damage. Militias aligned with Iran frame the conflict as resistance, while governments frame it as destabilization.

Meanwhile The Ayatollah Trump calls this the “last best chance” to deal with Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, which is the diplomatic equivalent of saying, “Trust me, I know what I’m doing,” right before he pulls the cord to start the chainsaw while holding the bar between his legs.  He’s already admitted the war may last longer than the four to five weeks he predicted—because of course it will. Wars are like home renovations: double the time, triple the cost, and someone always ends up bleeding. Meanwhile, Iran’s death toll is officially 787 and unofficially “much higher,” which is government‑speak for “we stopped counting when the numbers got depressing.”  

Israel has moved troops into Lebanon, Hezbollah is firing back, and the Gulf states are swatting missiles like mosquitoes. The U.S. has closed embassies, evacuated personnel, and warned Americans to leave 14 countries—because nothing says “regional stability” like telling your citizens to run for their lives.

George W. Bush’s legacy is now the Middle East’s version of the “Don’t stick your fork in the toaster” warning label. Everyone knows it’s there. Everyone ignores it. Why?

Bush toppled a regime with no plan for the day after, while   Trump has launched a region‑wide conflict with no plan for the day after lunch. Bush underestimated sectarian blowback, while Trump underestimated everything, including how many countries Iran can hit with missiles before breakfast. Bush said the mission was accomplished, Trump has said it would take “four to five weeks”. Both are shining examples of wishful thinking. It is, in the words of H.L Mencken, “The triumph of wishful thinking over experience.” On a more worldly note, the late George Carlin would call it “The same old shit with a new paint job.”

In conclusion it is worth remembering that none of this was likely to happen if we had continued honoring The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed July 14, 2015.  It was a multilateral agreement between Iran and the U.S., U.K., France, Russia, China, and Germany plus the EU. It followed two years of negotiations and was designed to ensure Iran’s nuclear program remained exclusively peaceful. The agreement provided for key nuclear restrictions on Iran, including: Enrichment limits: Iran agreed to cap uranium enrichment far below weapons‑grade levels.

Stockpile limits: Iran drastically reduced the amount of enriched uranium it could possess.

Facility restrictions: Sensitive sites like Fordow and Natanz were placed under strict operational limits.

Centrifuge reductions: Iran removed or mothballed thousands of centrifuges.

Inspections: The IAEA was granted an unprecedented verification regime—continuous monitoring, access to declared sites, and oversight of the entire supply chain.

In return, Iran Got sanctions relief:  Nuclear‑related sanctions were lifted, allowing Iran access to frozen assets and international markets. Economic reintegration: Iran could sell oil, conduct banking, and rejoin global trade networks. In other words, resume normal relations and interact with the rest of the world, vice remaining isolated and angry.

President Obama framed the JCPOA as the most consequential foreign‑policy debate since the Iraq War. His argument was simple. Without a deal, Iran would continue enriching without oversight and with a deal, Iran’s pathways to a bomb would be blocked or slowed, and inspectors would have eyes everywhere. The White House at the time emphasized that the agreement “blocked every possible pathway” to a nuclear weapon while maintaining intrusive verification. It was a narrow, technocratic arms‑control agreement—and intentionally so.

And yet: In 2018, Trump pulled the U.S. out of the JCPOA, calling it a “bad deal” (don’t you love the man’s gift of language?) and arguing it didn’t address missiles or Iran’s regional activities. This withdrawal is widely cited as one of the most consequential foreign‑policy moves of his first term. After the withdrawal, Iran gradually resumed higher‑level enrichment, expanded stockpiles, and restarted activities previously frozen under the deal.

Why does this matter today? It matters because the current war is happening against the backdrop of a nuclear program that was once heavily constrained under the JCPOA but lost those constraints after the U.S. withdrawal. Since, then, Iran’s Nuclear facilities have survived multiple Israeli and U.S. strikes, and Iran still retains significant enriched uranium, according to the IAEA.

The Obama accords are now being invoked as the “road not taken”, and as a moment when diplomacy, not violence and death, temporarily froze the nuclear clock. It’s running once again.

We, and the world, deserve so much better.